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I would like to begin my remarks by making two utterly contradictory
statements with regard to the relationship, as I see it, between the global
phenomenon of child labor, and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The first is that there is no relationship whatsoever between these two
subjects, that the WTO has no institutional capacity to respond to concerns
about even the worst forms of child labor; and indeed that much of the academic
writing on the subject of a notional relationship between these topics has been
largely wasted effort.
The other, contrasting, statement, is that attempts to imagine an effective
and enforceable global regulatory response to child labor, as well as to other
human rights abuses, is inextricably connected with the rise of World Trade
Organization law since the mid 1990s, in the sense that a set of genuine "rights
to trade" (with states acting as proxies for their most powerful transnational
economic actors) has offered an irresistible model for the achievement of other
kinds of global regulatory structures.
The idea, however, that the WTO as it is, and with the name it carries, can
or will influence the destiny of most or even many child laborers, is completely
fanciful. For one thing, there is quite literally nothing in WTO law concerning
child labor, apart from the abstract debate as to whether or not Article XX of the
GATT should allow member countries to maintain import bans on the products
of child labor. I would like to make clear that in stating that the WTO lacks
capacity to be effective in this area, I am not motivated by hostility towards
proposals for a WTO "social clause," one that might incorporate core labor
standards as part of the necessary preconditions to state participation in the
WTO system of trade rights and obligations. For the most part, advocates of a
social clause have been well intentioned, seeking to preserve labor rights in the
developed world, while assisting the workers of the developing world.2 At the
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Much has been written on the "new legalism" of the WTO, as compared with the looser and
more diplomatic structures of the former GAIT system. See, e.g, Robert L. Howse, The House That Jackson
Built: Restructuring the GA7T System, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 107 (Winter 1999).
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same time, it is clear to me that a legally binding "social clause," however vital
to the creation of a fairly regulated global order, actually belongs elsewhere than
within the WTO.
It is of course significant that the WTO is the ultimate symbol of
globalization, as it is the legal mechanism for the dismantling of the national
economic impulse.3 The phenomenon of child labor, on the other hand, must
be seen as the ultimate symbol of a failure to achieve a corresponding global
protection for the vulnerable. The urgency with which the issue of child labor
should be approached has little to do with the question of whether child labor
has in fact increased specifically to service the "global economy." It would
appear that a relatively small percentage of child labor in the developing world
participates directly in the "global" or export economy, but this is beside the
point, and in no way absolves global institutions and/or developed country
governments from responsibility.4 Globalization exists; strong transnational
actors have access to global markets; and child labor of all kinds continues to
exist and dominate the lives of a significant proportion of the world's children.
Beyond this clear proposition, there is no necessity for attribution of blame;
there is only a compelling reason to seek a solution.
It is very telling that the WTO's Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 1996
stated that the International Labor Organization (ILO) alone had the
"competence" to enforce global labor standards.5 This was particularly ironic,
since the then newly minted WTO did in fact have enforcement "competence,"
albeit only as far as trade principles were concerned; whereas the ILO was well
known not to enjoy such competence. While the ILO clearly has responsibility
for generating international labor standards, it lacks the type of enforcement arm
that sets the WTO apart from other international law systems.
(arguing that a social clause would provide a mechanism to deter hazardous and exploitative international
child labor); see also, Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty
Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. I (Fall 1999).
3.

See Jeff Atik, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO.

WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451 (2001). Atik writes: "The WTO is feared as a super-government, driven by the logic
of free trade to override national preferences."
4.
For recent statistics on the scale and nature of child labor worldwide, see Every Child Counts:
New Global Estimates on Child Labour, I.L.O. (2002).
5.
Certain member delegations had argued in favor of inclusion of a commitment to a "core labor
standards" provision in the declaration, but this was ultimately defeated, mainly by the resistance of
developing countries. See James L. Kenworthy, U.S. Trade Policy and the World Trade Organization: The
Unraveling of the Seattle Conference and the Future of the WTO, 5 GEO. PUB POL'Y REV. 103 (2000).
Kenworthy writes that "during the Singapore conference, the United States.. had pushed for a significant
statement by the ministers that could lead to future negotiations in the area of core labor standards and trade
and environment. ....However, Washington was forced to give way on its demands for further work on labor
standards in the WTO as the price of bringing Pakistan, India and some other hardline developing countries
on board." Id. at 107.
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"We renew our commitment," the Singapore Declaration states, "to the
observance of internationally recognized core labor standards. The ILO is the
competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support
for its work in promoting them."'6 The Declaration goes on to say that "We
believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and
further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards." And
most significantly, reflecting the suspicions of many developing countries, "We
reject the use of labor standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the
comparative advantage of countries, particularly low wage developing
countries, must in no way be put into question."
It has baffled me, as a long-time observer of writing on the topic of "trade
and..."--trade and human rights, trade and labor, trade and the
environment-that there has been a near-obsession by many academics with the
question of what the WTO might, through the interpretation of GATT Article
XX by panels and the Appellate Body, "allow."' 7 Or what those two bodies
could be induced to "take on board" in terms of a non-economic, human
dimension. Or what the Appellate Body will "come to understand" with regard
to an ultimate synthesis of conflicting state obligations arising from different
and opposing treaties-trade versus labor, the environment, human rights. I
have no doubt that such a synthesis must be carried out, but not by any organ
of the WTO. Rather, the real and inescapable need is for another, as yet
undefined, global institution to carry out this synthesis; not a trade organization
the sole focus of which, the sole ethos and objective of which, is to facilitate
trade.8
I would term the entire "Article XX" approach, with its narrow WTO
focus, reductionist at best. At worst, it is a distraction that leads one to ignore
the actual facts of global child abuse; the reality of child trafficking for the
6.

For a complete discussion of the history and characteristics of the ILO, see HECTOR J.

BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL

STANDARDS SYSTEM AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS (Boulder, Colo. And Oxford, England: Westview Press)

(1996).
7.
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade deals with "general exceptions" to
the substantive GATI requirements. With the caveat that trade restrictions covered by this article may not be
"applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade," GATT"parties are allowed
to maintain measures that can be justified for reasons of public morals, the protection of human, animal or
plant life, relating to the products of prison labor, or to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and
similar public interest objectives. For a general discussion of the relationship between Article XX and human
rights issues, see Salman Bal, InternationalFree TradeAgreements and Human Rights: ReinterpretingArticle
XXofthe GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL Trade 62, 72 (2001).

8.
For an exploration of the clash between trade and non-trade values, see Frank J. Garcia, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets: Trading Away the
Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK J. INT'L L. 51 (1999).
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purposes of work in sweatshops and in the sex industry. That is why, in my
view, the fact of a global economy leads inevitably to the need for a global
solution to such economic outrages; at the same time, I maintain that the WTO
itself, as an institution, is not the place to look for that solution.
There have been periodic bursts of academic speculation on the subject of
what the WTO's Appellate Body would now do if clearly faced with a challenge
to a national import restriction on imports of products made from child labor.
The favored hypothetical in these discussions is the case of a WTO member
country that creates an import ban on the products of child labor. (The US and
EC do, in fact, maintain certain restrictions on the import of products of child
labor, but these are far from comprehensive and of course cannot begin to
identify all incoming products that might contain elements produced through the
agency of child labor. 9)
By way of background to the "child labor hypothetical", the recent history
of conflict between national regulation in the public interest and GATT rules
probably dates most explicitly to the famous "Tuna Dolphin" (pre-WTO) cases
of the early 1990s. The upshot of these two (unadopted) panel decisions was
that (i) the US could not engage in "extraterritorial" imposition of its dolphin
conservation law, by in essence demanding these standards of its GATT trading
partners, and that (ii) under GATT principles, a party could only deal with the
end "product"; in other words, could not justify differential treatment of that
product based on the "process" through which the product was made, or in this
case, caught. Though the Tuna-Dolphin panel reports remained unadopted, and
thus without real legal effect, they caused a serious ripple of alarm across the
environmental community worldwide; the message was that hard-won
environmental regulation could be invalidated by the operation of GATT law.'°
The possible chilling effect on future environmental laws, at least those that
relied on import restrictions as a means of national enforcement, was clear.
Equally clear was that other non-trade, public interest values were also
potentially at risk."
9.
See Benjamin James Stevenson, Pursuing and End to Foreign Child Labor Through US Trade
Law: WTO Challenges and Doctrinal Solutions, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129, 145 - 151 (2002)
(describing the US framework of laws attempting to discourage imports of goods produced through child
labor).
10.
See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna Dolphin I), Report of the Panel,
DS2 I/R-39S/155, 3 September 1991; and United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna Dolphin II),
DS 29/R, 16 June 1994. For a complete discussion of these attempts to rely on Article XX to defend national
environmental laws, see Padideh Ala'1, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO
Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. Rev. 1129
(1999).
I1. For early reaction to the Tuna-Dolphin reasoning, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Using Trade to
Enforce International Environmental Law: Implicationsfor United States Law, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD.
273 (1994).
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Trade law specialists have made much of the fact that the more recent
Shrimp/ Turtle cases have led to national conservation laws being treated more
deferentially by the WTO's Appellate Body, and the objectives of the
Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) at least acknowledged by
the WTO bodies. 12 A supposed evolution in the thinking and sensitivity of the
Appellate Body has been pointed to; sometimes even celebrated. Although in
the Appellate Body's hands not an "Article XX" case per se, this positive
tendency has also been noted in the "Asbestos" case, wherein a French ban on
asbestos-containing products was allowed to stand, on the basis that the inherent
danger of the products concerned legitimized the French difference in treatment
of otherwise similar products--some with asbestos, some without. 13 These
developments have been hailed by some as the end of the old Tuna Dolphin
product/process line of reasoning. The logic of these discussions is that the
Appellate Body will continue to pursue a more enlightened set of principles
allowing for the happy co-existence of economic and non-economic principles,
and national governments will supposedly be free to implement other
international obligations through the device of import bans where these are felt
to be central to the attainment of non-trade goals.
My dominant impression in reading such academic discussions has been:
What on earth does this have to do with the broader effects of the momentum
of globalization? With environmental degradation, with the frantic drive to
develop, with the suffering of people caught up in these processes? And, as a
very fundamental matter, it must be asked whether developed countries do in
fact maintain import restrictions capable of dealing more than superficially with
human rights and environmental abuses, based on consideration of the
"processes" through which certain items are produced for export by trading
partners in the developing world? Isn't it true that the products likely to be
identified through such import bans represent only the tip of the iceberg, when
it comes to child labour and other abuses? Aren't many academic discussions
of Article XX wastefully theoretical, given the scale of the problem, and of the
non-trade values at stake?
12.
See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Product, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (October 12, 1998); United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/RW
(October 22, 2001). For a complete discussion of the reasoning in both phases of the case, see Robert Howse,
The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baselinefor the Trade and Environment
Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491 (2002).

13.
See European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS 135/AB/R (March 12, 2001). See also Laura Yavitz, The World Trade
Organization Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 43 (2002) (describing the Appellate Body's decision as

"positive and important").
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Despite the fact that import restrictions on goods produced under abusive
labor conditions may do little to ameliorate these conditions on any scale, we
may nevertheless be about to see a showdown at the WTO between just such a
set of import restrictions and free trade principles. This impending dispute,
described below, is symbolic of the hostility so often expressed by developing
countries towards the prospect of "trade and" restrictions by wealthy countries
against products from the developing world that, in their production process,
have offended against non-economic principles (such as core labor standards)
derived from some other sector of international law.14 And while the true "trade
and human rights" debate goes far beyond the question of how the WTO bodies
will treat national labor-based import restrictions, we should nevertheless take
this opportunity to recognize the symbolic value of this upcoming dispute,
described below.
In a perverse way, the very narrowness of the "trade and" academic debate
to date has generated a "trade and" backlash on the part of developing countries
in the WTO, who fear that the developed world is merely seeking a new set of
excuses to deny market access to products from the developing world, where a
production process does not meet certain externally imposed standards. 5 By
way of background to the dispute alluded to above, both the US and the EC
maintain certain import restrictions as preconditions on participation in their
"generalized system of (tariff) preferences" for products from the developing
world.16 These GSP programs, dating from the early 1970s, were created under
pressure from developing countries, and enjoy a specific GATT waiver allowing
the wealthier GATT countries to offer preferential tariff terms to a wide variety
of manufactured goods from the developing world. India's principal claim in
the present dispute, still at consultation stage, is that the labor and
environmental conditions being set by the EC as the cost of participation in its
GSP program is not in accordance with the language of the original provisions
14.
Indian Minister for Commerce and Industry Murasoli Maran was reported to state that
"developing countries have long opposed the linkage of trade with labor and environmental standards on the
grounds that they might be used as an excuse to distort competition, undermine comparative advantage and
provide a 'Trojan horse' of protectionism." Maran Opposes New Non-Trade Issues at WTO Meeting, THE

HINDU, June 20, 2001.
15.

Professor Jadish Bhagwati has been quoted as saying that "The bid to bring the social clause

under the World Trade Organization must be resisted tooth and nail," and perhaps more disingenuously, that
"[if] you change the WTO to reflect the Western view that everything is right with the West and is bad with
developing countries, then you are putting a bomb under the WTO." 'Resist Bid to Bring Social Clause Under
the WTO, THE ECONOMIC TIMES OF INDIA, December 17, 2000.

16.
The US Trade and Development Act of 2000 made a grounds of ineligibility to participation in
the US GSP scheme that a country "has not implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of
child labor." Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. 114 Stat. 25 1.

The same act also added to the

general prohibition against the importation into the United States of the products of "convict labor," a
prohibition against importing products made from the "forced or indentured child labor." Id. at § 411.
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enabling the EC to deviate from GATT Article I in order to grant the
preferences in question. The GATT language of the "enabling clause"
demanded that "generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences"
be "beneficial to the developing countries in order to increase the export
earnings, to promote the industrialization, and to accelerate the rates of
economic growth" and that the preferences should be designed "to facilitate and
promote the trade of developing countries", and to "respond positively" to their
developmental, financial and trade needs. India argues that the EC conditions
cannot be reconciled with the original requirements, as they create "undue
difficulties for India's exports to the EC."'"
India is unlikely to prevail in this dispute, assuming it goes forward, for a
number of reasons. More cautious and politically aware these days, the WTO
bodies might well decide to interpret the GSP enabling language conservatively,
and avoid a hot-button clash between trade and non-trade principles. However,
if a violation of GATT law were to be found, the stage would be set for
arguments under Article XX, to the effect that national concern for labor
standards justifies the trade restriction-the very stuff of the academic
hypotheticals! Whatever happens, it is significant that, just as the Indian
Pharmaceuticals cases made us realize that the developed world was going to
use TRIPS aggressively whatever the ultimate effects, 8 this current action by
India demonstrates the level of hostility to the idea of "linage"-linking
international trade law, and WTO law in particular, to non-trade values,
resulting in import restrictions. This hostility obtains even where violation of
core labor standards plainly amounts to violation of international human rights
law, and can have little to do with anyone's traditional notion of "comparative
advantage."
Interestingly, this hostility of developing world governments is aimed at
a relatively modest attempt to influence labor standards extraterritorially:
17.
See European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, Request for Consultations by India, WT/DS246/l/G/I.521-, (March 12, 2002). For a discussion
of the EU's approach to GSP, see William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human rights, the UN Global
Compact and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501 (2001). They write: "The key features of the
EU's GSP include tariff modulation, country-sector graduation, and special incentive arrangements. The
special incentive arrangements, operational as of 1998, refer to labor rights and environmental protection.
Special trade provisions are given to countries that comply with ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 concerning
the rights to organize and bargain collectively, and No. 138 with respect to the minimum age for
employment." The more recent version of the EU scheme makes even stronger demands on developing
countries, in terms of application of the ILO "core labor standards." Id. at 508.
18.
See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R (December 19, 1997). In this case and a similar complaint was
brought by the EC against India. India was required to create a legally sound transitional "mailbox" system
for the filing of patents; and in more general terms, to confront, soon after the coming into effect of the TRIPS
Agreement, the deficiencies, from a developed country point of view, in its national patent law.
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conditions on participation in a GSP program. We are not even in the realm of
the "social clause" here-the social clause being a far more ambitious idea, one
that would impose actual core standards on WTO members. We are not even
near the possibility of making widespread reliance on child labor part of an
accepted theory of unfair trade in the form of "social dumping."
We are probably now far enough removed from November/December 1999
that we can bear to think about the ministerial debacle of "Seattle." At the time,
President Clinton made these famous remarks: "I believe the W.T.O. should
make sure that open trade does indeed lift living standards, respect core labor
standards that are essential not only to workers' rights, but to human rights.
That's why this year the United States has proposed that the W.T.O. create a
working group on trade and labor."' 9 The rest is, of course, history. There was
fierce resistance to Clinton's proposals from some of the most powerful of the
developing countries, with India in the lead. Certain popular intellectuals,
foremost among these Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University, were scathing
in their criticism of the "pro labor standards"--and decidedly anti-WTO--street
demonstrators who came to prominence at Seattle. Disorganized and divided
as they were, the demonstrators had come to see the WTO as a main contributor
to the death of national regulation in the public interest.
Oddly, depending on the issue, I both strongly agree and strongly disagree
with Professor Bhagwati. On the one hand, he has come out in favor of a World
Bank sponsored program of wealth transfers to deal with problems caused by
adjustments to economic globalization in the developing world. 0 (It is, in my
view, often this wealth transfer dimension that eludes the "pro-social clause"
progressives who critique the WTO.) Bhagwati has also made the point, over
and again, that trade sanctions and import restrictions will not "make a dent" in
the problem of child labor. I believe he is correct in this. He cites to the
frequently mentioned example of female children in the Bangladeshi textile
industry who, having been let go under the threat of the Child Labor Deterrence

19. See Clyde Summers, The Battle In Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22
U. PA.J, INT'L ECON. L. 61 (2001) [hereinafter Summers]. Summers writes: " [Clinton] further inflamed the
issue by making an unplanned statement to a newspaper that the trade group should at some point use
sanctions to enforce core labor rights around the world. Clinton's statement provoked an adamant response
from developing countries, which saw any tying of trade to labor or environmental rights as disguised
protectionism by developed countries to keep out exports from developing countries and stymie their
development." Id. at 62.
20.
"I have therefore argued that the Bretton Woods institutions must be geared to providing
compensation or adjustment assistance to poor countries harmed by the freeing of trade at the WTO.... It is
time toput the president of the World Bank to work systematically to buttress the world trading system and
the helpful freeing of trade that the WTO oversees and encourages, by aiding the poor as necessitated by those
WTO actions." Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question ofLinkage, 96:1 AM. J. INT'L L. 126-127 (2002).
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(Harkin) Act of 1995 (unenacted), soon found themselves in far worse
circumstances, particularly in the sex trade.2'
His continued attacks on concerned young people in the West, however,
fail to make sense, as most of these protestors are attempting to bring a human
dimension to a globalizing world, an agenda that in itself can hardly be seen as
anything but positive. In a recent article, Bhagwati decries the fact that many
of these are young people trained in comparative literature, rather than
economic, leading them into delusions about the nature of "global capitalism."
"Capitalism," Bhagwati writes, "should be defended against ignorant,
ideological, or strategic assaults. 2
Who could seriously argue that there is in fact no gross disproportion
between the laws favoring transnational economic activity on the one hand, and
those devoted to human rights and labor concerns on the other? And who would
advocate that this discrepancy continue as is into the indefinite future? To the
extent that reliance on child labor, especially in its worst forms, is indicative of
societal failure and economic breakdown, a quantitative assessment of the
relationship between globalization and child labor is unnecessary. What matters
is that the two phenomena co-exist. Whether or not there are certain elements
in the United States motivated by job protectionism when they denounce
reliance on child labor is equally irrelevant. Social dumping may well be a fact;
there is no shame is wishing to preserve one's job; and the labor movement in
the developed world does have important principles to preserve.23
It is important to recognize that denunciation of those who are advocating
some version of good global governance and a fairer world trading order leaves
us no nearer to solving the most pernicious forms of abuse, including child
labor. At its most virulent, this sort of denunciation creates a false dichotomy
between the interests of concerned citizens in the developed world and people
in the developing world, who suffer the most from the gross disparities
discussed above. One UPI correspondent goes so far as to say that many NGOs
involved in the anti-globalization movement are peopled by "busybodies,
preachers, critics, do-gooders, and professional altruists," encroaching "on state
24
sovereignty in the name of international law.
However, as Professor Clyde Summers asked in a recent article, we need
to question how far some are willing to take the idea of comparative advantage.

21.

See Jagdish Bhagwati, Coping with Antiglobalization; A Trilogy of Discontents, FOREIGN

AFFAIR,S January/February 2002-, at 2.

22.

Id.

23.
See George Ross, Labor versus Globalization, 570 ANNALS Am. ACAD.POL.& SOC. SC. 78
(2000) (describing the empirical difficulties faced by the "international" labor movement in an age of
globalization).
24.

See Sam Vaknin, Commentary: The Self-Appointed Altruists, UPI, October 9, 2002.
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He points out that it is not even an option for us to include within the stock of
a nation's comparative advantage violations of ILO Convention 182 on the
Worst Forms of Child Labor, since to say that such violations are merely the
sovereign business of a particular state is to countenance human rights
violations in the name of free trade-a plainly irrational position.25 Summers
also makes the point that many of the countries most adamantly opposed to
using any trade-related device to enforce core labor standards have themselves
ratified the relevant conventions and are bound by their (admittedly more or less
unenforceable) obligations.26
Naturally enough, there is a fear that the wealthy developed countries
might hide behind these standards to engage in some form of insidious
protectionism. However, as Robert Howse has suggested, this need not be the
case at all. As far as the "import restriction and Article XX" issue is concerned,
even the WTO would at least carry out a review of the exact nature of the
import restriction concerned.27 If claims for the effectiveness of import
restrictions in dealing with such abuses as the worst forms of child labor have
been fanciful, then certainly the claims made regarding the protectionist dangers
inherent in allowing such restrictions have also been wildly exaggerated.
But I have already made clear that my own focus is not the narrow question
of whether or not national import restrictions may be maintained, within the
terms of GATT Article XX. The WTO has no interpretive capacity to deal with
larger human rights issues; no mandate; no substance. No national import
restriction can in fact greatly influence the empirical fact of widespread labor
abuses, such as the worst forms of child labor.
In the concluding section of this paper, I will suggest my own approach to
the problem of "trade and child labor." My vision is not one of a new and more
enlightened WTO; nor do I subscribe to the doctrine that "time alone" will bring
about development that will of itself eliminate child labor and other
economically-based human rights abuses.28

25.

See Summers, supra note 19, at 65-68, 86, 90.

26.

Summers at 67.

For a positive view of the possibility of synthesizing core ILO principles and WTO obligations,
27.
see Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 131 (1999). (Howse writes of the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental principles and Rights
at work, adopted by the ILO membership, as a "watershed," in that "the Declaration makes achievement of
compliance with fundamental labor rights an obligation arising from the very status of membership in the ILO.
When the issue is egregious violations of these rights-such as violent suppression of collective bargaining,
gender discrimination, forced or slave labor, or exploitative child labor-trade measures are not necessarily
a protectionist attempt to level the playing field. Instead they may resemble the kinds of sanctions against
gross human rights violations that have been imposed by many members of the world community against
South Africa under apartheid and, more recently, against Serbia." Id. at 133.
28.

[Malaysian Prime Minister] Mahathir criticized some of the new WTO proposals, that link and
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As far as methodology is concerned, there has been far too much attention
paid to the study of the WTO in isolation from other global institutions, and
indeed from empirical phenomena generally. Joseph Stiglitz has clearly
identified the deeply flawed and ideologically based functioning of the IMF and
World Bank, and it is plain that the WTO cannot serve as an instrument for
development in the absence of a genuine "linkage" among all three of these
institutions.29 It is almost unthinkable that, in the absence of targeted
investment mediated by a global finance body, there could be adequate levels
"spontaneous" development attained in much of the developing world.
It could be said that the creation of the WTO, with its mechanisms of
enforcement, highly unusual in the context of "international law," has generated
a collective imagination in the direction of a more structured set of global
institutions. This in turn must lead to a recognition of the need for a court-like
body capable of synthesizing conflicting international obligations, including
conflicts between trade rights and labor standards. Key to the success of such
a global system is a redistributive body to fund programs proven effective in
eliminating abuses like the worst forms of child labor.
I understand it when Professor Summers laments that "There is no
international agency other than the WTO able to effectively exert pressure for
observance of rights on a global basis."3 But this absence of an alternative
body is not adequate reason for allowing or expecting the WTO to do that which
it does not know how to do. Summers is surely right, though, when he states
that "freedom of international trade is subject to observance of internationally
recognized basic human rights."'" The concept of "subject to," however, is both
mysterious and deeply ambiguous. How can we make countries "subject to"
that which they insist they cannot afford? But how, on the other hand, can we
countenance transnational corporations, many based in the developed world,
continuing to profit from their access to resources and markets in the developing
world, where widespread abuses against children proliferate?
condition trade and investment to non-trade issues, such as labor standards, human rights, democracy, child
labor. Making those conditional will retard the growth of many developing countries, he warned. He noted
rich countries had taken more than a century to teach their present status of social and economic
sophistication. 'It is unrealistic to expect developing countries to achieve such levels of sophistication
overnight," he said. Sonia Jessup, Malaysia PM decries globalization, WTO, UPI, September 10, 2001.
29.
See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 12 - 13 (2002). As for the IMF,
Stiglitz writes "[o]ver the years, since its inception the IMF has changed markedly. Founded on the belief that
markets often worked badly, it now champions market supremacy with ideological fervor." And of the handin-glove activities of the IMF and World Bank during the 1980s, he writes that "[tihe IMF and World Bank
became the new missionary institutions, through which these ideas [free market ideology] were pushed on the
reluctant poor countries that often badly needed their loans and grants."

30.

Summers, supra note 19, at 89.

31.

Id. at 90.
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A significant amount of attention has been paid to attempts to take action
in US courts against US multinational corporations involved in serious
labor/human rights abuses; as well as to the production of corporate "codes of
32
conduct" meant to govern the conduct of developed world multinationals.
There have been a number of actions brought against US corporations under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, a statute that allows alien plaintiffs to seek a remedy in
US courts where another party has acted "in violation of the law of nations or
treaty of the United States. 33 While such actions are very important devices for
drawing attention to abusive conduct by US corporations, the statute is quite
difficult to use, in that it applies to only a small band of corporate acts. One
must link the conduct to international law principles; normally by demonstrating
that a US corporation has been complicit in the abusive conduct of a repressive
foreign regime. This kind of legal action bears little relationship with the mass
phenomenon of child labor, though it is conceivable that certain particularly
egregious corporate conduct could fall within the net of the statute. As for selfregulatory codes, these too are potentially significant, but are unlikely to have
any generalized effects on the general problem of child labor. Although one
might argue over the precise figures, it should be recalled that only a certain,
perhaps small, proportion of labor abuses against children involve Western
multinationals.
Without either fetishizing or ignoring the connection between international
trade law and child labor, I would propose a multifaceted approach to
eliminating the worst forms of child labor, a task which must be seen as an
international obligation falling on all parties having any degree of influence
over the process of globalization. First of all, the reality of the contentious
divide between the views of the developed and developing worlds with regard
to the fairness of relying on import restrictions as a device to promote higher
labor standards must be recognized. Penalizing countries with the most
vulnerable economic profiles actually makes little sense, and cannot have the
desired global effect, despite the reams of academic writing on the subject of
"trade and labor, and the role of GATT Article XX".
Where OECD-based multinationals are involved in the exploitation of
children for economic gain, any sanctions should be against the corporations in
question. This would involve the creation of a far more effective set of OECD
32.
On actions brought in US courts, see Andrew Ridenour, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Apples and
Oranges: Why Courts Should Use International Standards to Determine Liability for Violation of the Law of
Nations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 Tul. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 581 (2001) (discussing reliance on the

Alien Tort Claims Act in US courts); and on voluntary international codes of conduct for MNEs, see Meaghan
Shaughnessy, The United Nations Global Compact and the Continuing Debate About the Effectiveness of

Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 159 (2000).
33.
28 USC § 1350 (1993), stating that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien in tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the United States."
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rules, with mandatory national implementation, than anything that exists to
date. 4 I could not in good conscience state that such a development is
politically likely. Nevertheless, it is clear that where developed world MNEs
are directly involved in labor/human rights abuses, regardless of the minimal or
nonexistent labor standards of the host country, the proper target of sanctions
in most cases is the MNE, not the host country. 35 (I make the point below that
sanctions against the host country could become appropriate, but only after a
transition period during which significant investment had been made in
programs to eliminate the worst forms of child labor and other abusive labor
practices.)
As has been pointed out, most child labor is tied to a given national
economy, and does not bear any direct relationship to MNEs. Nor is most child
labor related to export trade, although clearly some is. Relying on GATT
Article XX to justify import bans in such cases is certain to generate more
hostility, and have little effect on the underlying problem. Where there is no
relationship of the labor exploitation to exports, GATT Article XX is essentially
irrelevant in any case.
I would like to posit a "deep structure linkage," in which the very fact of
globalization means that the global economic institutions should be required to
act in a concerted manner to invest in the elimination of particular abuses. This
would necessitate a reorientation of the agendas of the IMF and World Bank in
particular. Whether seen in the context of human rights or long term economic
development, the elimination of the worst forms of child labor would be a
starting point for such targeted investment. While far too small in scale, there
are model programs, such as the ILO' s International program on the Elimination
of Child Labour (IPEC), designed to allow countries to eliminate child labor, by
giving children access to school and replacing child labor with adult labor--a far
more certain route to development than waiting for market liberalization to work
its magic. 36 The IMF and World Bank should be held to the achievement of
specific, empirically based goals, derived from the principles contained in
international conventions, including those of the ILO.

34.
See for instance, the OECD's aspirational Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises of 1976. The OECD emphasis in that document and its annexes was to ensure that
MNEs should meet the employment standards of the host country.
35.
I use the phrase "in most cases" to distinguish between general sanctions brought to bear against
a generally repressive and illegitimate regime; and the situation where a poor country lacks the resources to
eliminate the exploitation of child labor in its less virulent forms.
36.
See Mary Gray Davidson, The International Labour Organization's Latest Campaign to End
Child Labor: Will It Succeed Where Others Have Failed? I I TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (200 1)
(describing the IPEC campaign, which is based on assistance for a phased elimination of the worst forms of
child labor).
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My own perspective on the WTO is that it provides a model of
international regulation; not in its substance so much as in its "nonvoluntariness". Assuming that there was an international fund to assist in the
elimination of child labor, at that point developing countries and developed
countries should indeed have their participation in bodies like the WTO
conditioned on their good faith efforts to bring about results. The expansion of
global economic activity does bear a logical relationship to the impulse towards
global regulation. The WTO is possessed of an unusual and even exciting nonvoluntary quality, contributing to the prospect that non-trade law, including
labor and human rights law, might share that same non-voluntariness. How one
counters the economic forces that created the WTO with non-trade values, such
that a similar urgency could inform a project to eliminate the worst forms of
child labor, is a difficult political problem. For a start, there should be a
redirection of the content of anti-globalization protests, through the creation of
a list of firm "trade and" demands. The message of the global dissidents should
be more focused, centered on the principle that the right of developed countries
to profit from global business activity should depend on the contribution of
those same countries to high levels of targeted investment in a global regime to
protect core labor standards.

